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Living with the world crisis . . .  in Bombay
The Long Revolution
‘The first day of our independence will be the first day of the longer and harder struggle 
for economic liberation’ -S a m o ra  Machel, President of Mozambique. Reginald Green 
examines Mozambique and Angola in their first decade of political independence.
‘A lutta continua, victoria e certe, poder p o v o . . . ’ - t h e  
struggle continues, victory is certain, people’s p o w e r - a r e  
not in Angola and Mozambique mere rhetorical flourishes or 
flashy slogans to cover a basically unchanged reality. Maputo 
and Luanda today are very different from 1974. In parts of 
rural Mozambique and Angola the difference is even sharper.
The end of colonialism -especially  settler colonialism 
evicted by armed s t ru g g le - is  in itself a substantial change, 
but the political reconstruction goes further than that. Both 
the governing p a r t i e s - M P L A  in Angola, FRELIM O in 
Mozambique -  are committed to people’s power in the sense 
o f  broad popular involvement and initiative. Both have 
sought to build participation and people’s power to discipline 
leaders. Neither has had full success-econom ic  contraints, 
the realities o f  permanent externally-based domestic wars, 
the heritage o f  non-education and non-participation guaran­
teed that. But neither has settled into a rigid, self-satisfied 
bureaucratic mould, nor ceased to educate, to involve and to 
examine its record critically. In Mozambique this is very evi­
dent even to the casual observer. In Angola the M P L A ’s 
different style and the socio-political price o f  resisting South 
African invasions, Western (especially US) hostility, and 
South African backed domestic insurrection make observa­
tion much harder, but have not reversed the reality o f  change.
With a commitment to people’s power have come parallel 
commitments to people’s social and economic welfare and
progress. Health, education, and to some extent housing, are 
more mass-oriented in design and more available in practice. 
The division between the concrete cities o f  the affluent Euro­
peans and the shanty towns o f  the excluded and exploited 
Africans is blurring. Basic commodities receive priority in 
allocation o f  resources for production or importation and 
efforts are made to ensure availability at bearable prices.
But revolution has brought costs much deeper and more 
lasting than the physical damange o f  the armed struggle. 
Portuguese colonialism did not train A f r i c a n s - th e  depart­
ure o f  90% o f  the settlers and expatriates has starved the new 
states o f  middle and high-level personpower. Together with 
overt sabotage, this shortage o f  knowledge has led to severe 
losses in both agricultural and industrial ou tpu t, which 
remain substantially below 1972-74 levels in both countries, 
and have only slowly recovered from the 1978-79 troughs. 
Given the curtailment o f  settler and external drains, most 
Africans are better off, but it is a stark fact that revolution 
has not yet won through to a forward economic dynamic in 
Angola or Mozambique.
Constraints
The colonial economies were constructed to serve colonial 
powers, settlers and foreign companies. Because Portugal 
was itself not a developed industrial country (nor a country 
with representative government, civil liberties, social welfare
W ea p o n s  captured from  counter-revolutionaries  in M ozam biq u e  -  Decem ber 1981
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guarantees, or universal education), Portuguese colonies 
were particularly repressive and exclusionary. Africans 
suffered from forced labour and the lack of education and 
health care facilities. The colonies were subservient to foreign 
companies and countries, notably South Africa as an 
employer o f  migrant labour and purchaser of transport and 
tourism.
The colonial structure was dependent on the settlers’ role 
as purchasers, managers, and professional through to semi­
skilled operators. Predictably, it does not work well today, 
with the exception o f  those sectors of little interest to, or 
repressed by, Portugal, eg some elements of peasant agri­
culture, and those export enclaves in which a ‘new bargain’ 
with a foreign company has been achieved, eg oil and 
diamonds in Angola.
Training citizens, reconstructing institutions, bargaining 
with foreign firms can -  indeed since 1978-79 is beginning to 
-  restore output and exports within the existing parameters 
o f  productive forces. But that is still not adequate for the 
purposes o f  people-oriented development. The mix o f output 
as o f  the nearly 1970s was inadequate for the physical p ro ­
vision o f  basic consumer goods and basic public services to 
the majority o f  workers and peasants. Nor was it adequate 
for making substantial inputs into construction and capita 
goods. Similarly, the infrastructure was designed to serve the 
colonial economy, (or, in the case o f  Mozambican power and 
transport, the economies o f  Southern Rhodesia and South 
Africa), not broadly-based national or regional develop­
ment.
The dominance o f  exports was more a symptom than a 
cause o f  under and maldevelopment. Mozambique, in par­
ticular, has too few exports and too unsound a market mix 
for those it has. South Africa is the main market for power, 
transport and migrant labour. Mozambique must raise 
export levels to be able to buy the imports needed to create a 
new domestic, ‘need-oriented’ production pattern and higher 
output per capita. The colonial economic system, from the 
perspective o f  Angolan and Mozambican workers and pea­
sants, misused export proceeds, and failed to build a 
domestic economic base.
Opposition
By definition a revolution results in class, interest and indi­
vidual losers. If able, they will seek to sabotage, contain or 
reverse it. Angola and Mozambique demonstrate that p ropo­
sition and also the complexity o f  the pattern o f  enemies to the 
revolution and their reactions to it.
Ironically many major corporations have made their 
peace with Angola and Mozambique. Gulf Oil, Lonrho, 
Anglo America, Boeing, David Rockefeller (as a banker and 
a business spokesman), all see actual and potential mutual 
business interests. They deny any ideological impediment is 
sufficient to prevent growing economic relations and oppose 
attempts to isolate, destabilise or overturn the revolutionary 
party governments.
With a handful o f  exceptions, notably Sweden and 
recently Portugal, capitalist industrial state attitudes have 
ranged from caution, through rather grudging acceptance 
tied to conditions which virtually prevent response, to overt 
attempts to isolate and, at the least, encourage destabilisation 
(notably the US). Angola and Mozambique perceive themsel­
ves as isolated, not isolationist.
Settlers and expatriates have destabilised by leaving en 
masse. The small minority who stayed have been vital in 
keeping the economies and governments running, but they 
■ at most 5% . Many left even when attractive contracts of 
•i vice were offered. Some have busied themselves in 
inter-revolution, eg the settler revolt in 1975 in Mozam- 
1 ue, aimed at reacquiring local power in what would be 
uth African sponsored neo-colonies.
I he most bitter enemy is South Africa. Angola, Mozam-
e and Rhodesia were its geo-political buffer zone, and its
hopes for a Southern Africn ‘constellation’ o f  ‘like-minded’ 
states. Successful non-racial governments, prospering eco­
nomies and increased self-reliance, individually or worse, 
collectively, by its neighbours would undermine South 
Africa’s entire ‘national security sta te’. For that reason 
Angola and Mozambique have never known a day o f  real 
peace. South African raids, invasions and build-up o f  
pseudo-liberation movements (MRM in Mozambique, 
UNITA in Angola) have exacted a rising economic, social 
and political cost. Not merely are resources diverted, output 
lost; a state o f  war makes broadening participation and trust­
ing people infinitely harder.
Garrison Societies
Mozambique and Angola are in varying degree garrison 
societies, polities unable to devote their full efforts to recon­
struction, economies under seige. That is the price externally- 
backed armed resistance had imposed on revolution. The 
disruption o f  rural output and o f transport, especially in 
Angola, has required massive food imports and often made 
rural production or distribution problematic.
The price of passive resistance to the regimes is seen in 
general falls in output over 1974-78 with the loss o f  skilled 
personnel leading to breakdown of many production and 
service units and loss of institutional memory. It is also 
reflected in the need to ensure middle-class loyalty by allo­
cation of resources to amenity goods supplies (admittedly at 
prices above those for basic rationed allocations). The need 
continues for a security and inquiry system to identify the 
very real persons working to disrupt. That price is heightened 
by the externally-based armed resistance. Resources allo­
cated to the army cannot be used to revive rural transport. 
Blocking spying and sabotage requires a pervasive security 
system and a high degree of wariness and suspicion.
The Future
Change has been won in Angola and Mozambique. The 
initial falls in production have been halted and in part 
reversed. The initial social and, especially in Mozambique, 
political gains have been maintained and extended. To date, 
South African-based banditry and invasions do not threaten 
the socio-politico viability of the states nor their complete 
economic breakdown.
But ‘Victoria e certe’ is a commitment and a faith, not an 
assured reality. The global recession, the 1974-78 loss o f  p ro ­
ductive forces and the external destabilisation have imposed 
terrible strains on weak economic and weaker person-power 
structures. Until South Africa is forced to stop invading and 
encouraging insurgence, economic reconstruction will be 
slow. This could be achieved by effective trade and invest­
ment sanctions on South Africa by the Western powers. Until 
reconstruction has proceeded substantially a n d /o r  the global 
recession turned to recovery, the balance o f  payments con­
straint will continue to prevent any significant increases in 
personal consumption.
The commitment o f  Mozambique and Angola to reducing 
external dependence (especially on South Africa) via the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC) is a major initiative with substantial potential. 
Dependence can be reduced more rapidly and at lower cost at 
a regional rather than a national level in transport and com­
munication, industry, agriculture and energy. Further 
economic coordination both reduces the isolation o f  Angola 
and Mozambique, and increases the ability o f  each state to 
stand up to South Africa directly.
However, without more global pressure on South Africa 
to cease and desist, and more active understanding of, and 
cooperation with, Angola and Mozambique, the short-term 
future is not bright, and the medium-term problematic. ‘The 
struggle continues’ and is sustained by a commitment to 
victory which deserves far wider support in the West than it 
has received to date.
Has China ever sought to be self- 
reliant? John Gittings thinks not.
‘It is very dangerous to depend on foreign c o u n t r i e s . . . ’, 
Mao Zedong once said, arguing that China should ‘not 
depend on others as a matter o f  principle’. His views on self- 
reliance prevailed until the last years o f  his life, when a fierce 
argument over the import o f  foreign technology featured 
largely in the power struggle o f  1975-76. His successors now 
proclaim a policy o f  the Open Door, and this year have said 
that they will begin to use the extensive lines o f  credit -  
almost US$20 b il l io n -a lread y  offered by foreign govern­
ments and banks to help ‘modernise’ China.
But the reversal o f  policy is not so neatly linked to poli­
tical change as appears at first sight. The policy o f  self- 
reliance developed in the context o f  necessity; the fact was 
that China had been excluded from the bulk o f  Western tech­
nology for nearly two decades not because Mao shut the 
door, but because o f  the US trade embargo and pressure 
upon its allies. Soviet aid to China primed the pump of eco­
nomic rehabilitation in the 1950s, but in 1960 was cut o ff  by 
Khrushchev.
Foreign admirers o f  the ‘Chinese model’ gave it more 
theoretical consistency than it ever possessed. Mao himself 
could speak temptingly o f  Western participation in Chinese 
economic development when he had the right audience. In 
1945 he told an American diplomat that China could provide 
‘an outlet for (US) capital investment’.
What really broke down Western trade barriers was not 
M ao’s death but the Nixon visit nearly five years earlier. This 
mended US-China relations, brought Peking into the UN and 
opened the world market to it. China then tried to pursue a 
half-way policy o f  economic Westernisation, buying large 
quantities o f  plant but refusing even the most limited credit 
line. In 1974theTrade Minister insisted that ‘China will never 
try to attract foreign capital, or exploit domestic or foreign 
natural resources in conjunction with other countries’.
But C hina’s exports could not increase fast enough to 
satisfy the growing demand for Western technology, cham ­
pioned by the ‘economist’ group led by Vice-Premier Deng 
Xiaoping. In 1975-76 Deng urged that China mortgage its oil 
surplus and coal reserves in order to speed up the inflow of
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new technology. The Maoist ‘Gang o f Four’ accused Deng of 
inviting imperialism ‘to plunder C h ina ’s natural resources 
and bleed its people’. Deng lost that battle temporarily, but 
his views prevailed after M ao ’s death and the arrest o f  the 
Gang.
After Mao
Deng’s approach is backed up by growing demands o f  the 
Chinese people for higher standards o f  living. A healthier and 
better educated population no longer compares the present 
situation with the pre-Liberation years o f  famine and depri­
vation. Foreign tourists, films and television heighten the 
demonstration effect o f  the outside world.
The rejection o f  the Cultural Revolution’s ideology also 
reinforces consumer demands and legitimises a desire for the 
best and the most modern. Though Mao wanted China to 
become a leading world power, he set economic growth 
within a political context which in practice favoured a low 
wage, labour-intensive society and frowned on inequality and 
material ambition.
The new leaders, with a fair amount o f  popular support, 
have rejected M ao’s emphasis upon strengthening the poli­
tical framework for the ‘transition to com m unism ’. Now 
they proclaim the inevitability o f  the First Economic Law of 
Socialism -  which is, ‘to secure the maximum satisfaction of 
the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of 
the whole o f  society’.
Since 1979, China has already absorbed the equivalent of 
nearly $1.8 billion in direct foreign investment, more than a 
quarter o f  which is in joint-venture projects mostly located in 
the new Special Economic Zones. Commercial foreign 
borrowing has started cautiously but could reach $3 billion by 
1985. Extravagant Western hopes o f  ‘the market o f  a thou ­
sand million’ may still be disappointed, but a fundamental 
shift has occurred in Chinese economic theory and practice 
which cannot easily be reversed. Marx and Engels them­
selves, argued the Chinese journal R ed Flag in April this year 
pointed out long ago that ‘the closed-door and self-sufficien 
outlook was gradually becoming a thing o f  the pas t’.
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